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CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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LETTER DATED 1 APRIL 1974 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION

.... I have the honour to transmit herewith the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

A/RES/3077 (XXVIII) - "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"

A/RES/3078 A (XXVIII) - "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests"

A/RES/3078 B (XXVIII) - "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests"

I would draw attention, in particular, to the following specific provisions contained in these resolutions.

In resolution 3077 (XXVIII), operative paragraph 3 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, for their elimination from the arsenal of all States and for the complete realization of the objective as set forth in the resolution; and operative paragraph 7 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session.

In resolution 3078 A (XXVIII), operative paragraph 2 reiterates the conviction of the General Assembly that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban of the nature contemplated as long as ten years ago in the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,

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in Outer Space and under Water; and operative paragraph 3 urges once more the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear weapon tests either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria.

In resolution 3078 B (XXVIII), operative paragraph 5 vigorously urges the States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, especially those which are nuclear-weapon States and parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, immediately to start negotiations for elaborating a treaty designed to achieve the objective of a comprehensive test ban; and operative paragraph 6 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of highest priority, its deliberations on this treaty, taking into full account the suggestions already made in the Committee, as well as the views expressed at the current session of the General Assembly and at previous sessions, and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a special report on its deliberations on this vitally important matter, including the areas of agreement on the achievement of a draft treaty.

The General Assembly, in resolution 3077 (XXVIII), operative paragraph 6, also requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the First Committee relating to questions connected with the problem of chemical weapons and chemical methods of warfare. The relevant documents and records are the following: A/9141; A/C.1/L.653; A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1; A/C.1/PV.1934, 1935, 1938, 1940 - 1954, 1968, 1970; A/9363; and A/PV.2192.

In connexion with resolutions 3078 A and B (XXVIII), the relevant documents and records are the following: A/9141; A/9208; A/9081; A/9084; A/9086; A/9093; A/9107; A/9109; A/9110; A/9117; A/9166; A/C.1/1031; A/C.1/1036; A/C.1/1039; A/C.1/L.651; A/C.1/L.652; A/C.1/L.652/Rev.1; A/C.1/PV. 1934, 1935, 1938 1940 - 1953, 1956, 1960; A/9364; and A/PV.2192.

All these documents and records were distributed during the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly to all Members of the United Nations including all the Members of the Conference.

.... I also have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Members of the Conference, the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, at its twenty-eighth session, which deal with disarmament matters:

A/RES/3075 (XXVIII) - "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security"

A/RES/3076 (XXVIII) - "Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use"

A/RES/3079 (XXVIII) - "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

A/RES/3080 (XXVIII) - "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"

A/RES/3093 A (XXVIII) - "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries"

A/RES/3093 B (XXVIII) - "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries"

A/RES/3183 (XXVIII) - "World Disarmament Conference"

A/RES/3184 A (XXVIII) - "General and complete disarmament"

A/RES/3184 B (XXVIII) - "General and complete disarmament"

A/RES/3184 C (XXVIII) - "General and complete disarmament"

I also wish to refer to General Assembly resolutions 3056 (XXVIII), 3102 (XXVIII) and 3185 (XXVIII), which are related to disarmament matters.

In resolution 3056 (XXVIII) on the "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency", operative paragraph 5, the General Assembly commended the International Atomic Energy Agency for the progress it has made in meeting its safeguards responsibilities and in negotiating agreements for the application

of safeguards with non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular the agreements arrived at with the European Atomic Energy Community and the non-nuclear-weapon States of that organization.

In resolution 3102 (XXVIII) on "Respect for human rights in armed conflicts", operative paragraph 7, the Secretary-General was requested to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session on relevant developments concerning human rights in armed conflicts, in particular on the proceedings and results of the 1974 session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.

In resolution 3185 (XXVIII) on "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", operative paragraph 6, the General Assembly appealed to all militarily significant States to exert efforts in order to extend the political détente so far achieved to military détente, to stop the arms race as well as to take practical steps to reduce armament, with a view to making available additional resources for economic and social development, particularly to the developing countries.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3075 (XXVIII)
26 December 1973

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 29

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/9359)/

3075 (XXVIII). Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security",

Recalling its resolutions 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,

Taking note of the report of the Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament entitled Disarmament and Development, 1/

Noting that, despite the repeated calls by the General Assembly for the adoption of effective measures to put an end to the arms race, military expenditures, especially in the nuclear field, have continued to increase at an alarming speed,

Deeply concerned about the ever spiralling arms race, especially of nuclear armaments, and the heavy burden which it constitutes for all peoples,

Endorsing the conclusion of the report of the Secretary-General entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures that a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, particularly of those whose military expenditures are highest, should be brought about as soon as possible, 2/

1/ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.73.IX.1.

2/ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.72.IX.16, para. 120.

Considering that persistent action is necessary in order to halt and reduce the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, including continuous efforts towards reducing military budgets, starting with the heavily armed countries,

Considering also that the United Nations should play an effective role in the negotiations on the halting of the arms race and the reduction of military expenditures,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the measures he has taken to reproduce and publicize the report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2831 (XXVI);

2. Expresses its conviction that the report of the Secretary-General will contribute to a better understanding by Governments and public opinion of the gravity of the dangers which the continued acceleration of the arms race, especially the accumulation of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, constitutes for world peace and security and for the economic and social development of all countries;

3. Considers that the constant awareness and the continuing review of the effects of the arms race and of military expenditures, especially in the nuclear field, could facilitate future negotiations on disarmament;

4. Calls upon all States to make renewed efforts aimed at adopting effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, including the reduction of military budgets, particularly of the heavily armed countries, with a view to achieving progress towards general disarmament;

5. Requests the organs concerned with disarmament issues to place among their high preoccupations the problems related to the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, including the identification of the most appropriate ways and means of approaching matters regarding the reduction of military budgets;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue the study of the consequences of the arms race, paying special attention to its effects on the economic and social development of nations as well as on world peace and security, in order to enable him to submit, upon request by the General Assembly, an up-to-date report on that matter, on the basis of the information released by Governments;

7. Invites all Governments to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of the above request;

8. Reiterates its decision to maintain under constant review the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" and decides to include it in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.

2192nd plenary meeting
6 December 1973

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3076 (XXVIII)
26 December 1973

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 34

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/9362)/

3076 (XXVIII). Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in resolution 2932 A (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, it commended the report of the Secretary-General entitled Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use 1/ to the attention of all Governments and peoples and requested the Secretary-General to circulate the report to the Governments of Member States for their comments,

Taking note of the comments submitted by Governments 2/ and of the widespread wish that intergovernmental action should be taken with a view to reaching agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of these weapons,

Emphasizing the need to consider new rules designed to afford better protection of civilians and civilian objects during armed conflicts,

Convinced that the widespread use of many weapons and the emergence of new methods of warfare that may cause unnecessary suffering or are indiscriminate call urgently for efforts by Governments to seek, through possible legal means, the prohibition or restriction of the use of such weapons and of indiscriminate and cruel methods of warfare and, if possible, through measures of disarmament, the elimination of specific weapons that are especially cruel or indiscriminate,

Conscious of the difficulties involved in these tasks and the need for factual bases for discussion,

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1/ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.73.I.3.

2/ A/9207 and Corr.1.

Considering, as one such basis, in addition to the report of the Secretary-General, 1/ the extensive factual report elaborated by an international group of experts under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross entitled Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects, 3/ covering, inter alia, high-velocity projectiles, blast and fragmentation weapons, time-delay weapons and incendiary weapons, and endorsing the conclusions of the report that intergovernmental review and action regarding weapons of these kinds is called for,

Considering that prohibitions or restrictions of the use of such weapons should be examined without delay and that positive results in this regard are likely to facilitate substantive disarmament negotiations with a view to the elimination of production, stockpiling and proliferation of the weapons in question, which should be the ultimate objective,

Aware that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts will be convened at Geneva on the invitation of the Swiss Federal Council, with a first session envisaged to be held from 20 February to 29 March 1974,

Welcoming as a basis for discussion at that conference the proposals elaborated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and aiming, inter alia, at a reaffirmation of the fundamental general principles of international law prohibiting the use of weapons which are likely to cause unnecessary suffering and means and methods of warfare which have indiscriminate effects,

Considering that the efficacy of these general principles could be further enhanced if rules were elaborated and generally accepted prohibiting or restricting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects,

Taking note of the invitation issued by the twenty-second International Conference of the Red Cross to the International Committee of the Red Cross to call, in 1974, a conference of government experts to study in depth the question of the prohibition or restriction of the use of conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects and to transmit a report on the work of the conference to all Governments participating in the Diplomatic Conference with a view to assisting them in their further deliberations,

1. Invites the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to consider - without prejudice to its examination of the draft protocols submitted to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross - the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, and to seek agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons;

3/ Geneva, 1973.

2. Requests the Secretary-General, who has been invited to attend the Diplomatic Conference as an observer, to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session on aspects of the work of the Conference relevant to the present resolution.

2192nd plenary meeting
6 December 1973

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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GENERAL

A/RES/3077 (XXVIII)
26 December 1973

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 35

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/9363)]

3077 (XXVIII). Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 and 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972,

Expressing its determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction such as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Mindful of the increasing concern of the international community over developments in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Considering that chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare have always been viewed with horror and been justly condemned by the international community,

Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions that are contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 1/

Reaffirming the need for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol,

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1/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65.

Noting that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 2/ has already been signed by a large number of States,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 3/

Noting that a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, a ten-nation working paper dated 26 April 1973, a working paper dated 21 August 1973 on the main points of an international agreement and other working papers, proposals and suggestions have been submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

Convinced that an early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction would improve the prospects for international peace and security,

1. Reaffirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

2. Urges Governments to work towards the complete realization of the objective as set forth in the present resolution;

3. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, for their elimination from the arsenals of all States and for the complete realization of the objective as set forth in the present resolution;

4. Reaffirms its hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;

5. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925 and/or to ratify this Protocol, and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives contained therein;

2/ See General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

3/ A/9141-DC/236.

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the First Committee relating to questions connected with the problem of chemical weapons and chemical methods of warfare;

7. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session.

2192nd plenary meeting
6 December 1973

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3078 (XXVIII)
26 December 1973

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 36

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/9364)]

3078 (XXVIII). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests

A

The General Assembly,

Stressing its deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of nuclear weapon tests for the acceleration of the arms race and for the health of present and future generations of mankind,

Bearing in mind that in 1975 a conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1/ shall be held, one of whose principal aims will be assuring that the purposes set forth in its preamble, among which there is the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, are being realized,

Recalling its resolutions 914 (X) of 16 December 1955, 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957, 1252 (XIII) of 4 November 1958, 1379 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1402 (XIV) of 21 November 1959, 1577 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1578 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1632 (XVI) of 27 October 1961, 1648 (XVI) of 6 November 1961, 1649 (XVI) of 8 November 1961, 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2455 (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2604 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2663 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2828 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 and 2934 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972,

1. Condemns once again with the utmost vigour all nuclear weapon tests;

1/ See General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

2. Reiterates its conviction that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban of the nature contemplated as long as ten years ago in the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; 2/

3. Urges once more the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear weapon tests either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria.

2192nd plenary meeting
6 December 1973

B

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests, to contribute to a deceleration of the nuclear arms race, to the promotion of arms control and disarmament measures, and to a reduction of world tension,

Having considered the report submitted on 7 September 1973 by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 3/ in particular the section thereof concerned with achieving a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban,

Reaffirming its earlier resolutions on this subject, particularly resolution 2934 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972,

Noting that 5 August 1973 was the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,

Noting with regret that some States have not yet adhered to that Treaty,

Gravely disturbed at the fact that, ten years after the signature of that Treaty, wherein the parties seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly, nuclear weapon testing continues at an active pace,

Deeply concerned that, notwithstanding the opposition of the vast majority of States as expressed in that Treaty and in the resolutions of the General Assembly and other world bodies, nuclear weapon tests continue to take place in the atmosphere, despite the danger of radio-active contamination,

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2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

3/ A/9141-DC/236.

Distressed that, despite their intent expressed in that Treaty, which was reiterated in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 4/ to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to carry out negotiations to this end, the nuclear-weapon States parties to these Treaties have not yet engaged in the active negotiation for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and that States parties to these Treaties continue to test nuclear weapons underground,

1. Emphasizes its deep concern at the continuance of nuclear weapon tests, both in the atmosphere and underground, and at the lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement;

2. Calls anew upon all nuclear-weapon States to seek, as a matter of urgency, the end of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

3. Insists that the nuclear-weapon States which have been carrying out nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere discontinue such tests forthwith;

4. Urges States which have not yet adhered to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to do so without further delay;

5. Vigorously urges the States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, especially those which are nuclear-weapon States and parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, immediately to start negotiations for elaborating a treaty designed to achieve the objective of a comprehensive test ban;

6. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of highest priority, its deliberations on this treaty, taking into full account the suggestions already made in the Committee, as well as the views expressed at the current session of the General Assembly and at previous sessions, and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a special report on its deliberations on this vitally important matter, including the areas of agreement on the achievement of a draft treaty;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session an item entitled "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban" in place of the item entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" which appears on the agenda of the twenty-eighth session.

2192nd plenary meeting
6 December 1973

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3079 (XXVIII)
19 December 1973

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 37

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/9365)]

3079 (XXVIII). Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 and 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, in five of which there have been appeals to the nuclear-weapon States regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Reiterating its conviction that, for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol,

1. Notes with satisfaction that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which entered into force for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in 1969 and 1971, respectively, has been signed in 1973 by France and by the People's Republic of China and that the Governments of both countries have already decided to take the necessary measures for its ratification;

2. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), in conformity with the repeated appeals of the General Assembly;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)";

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session of any measure adopted by them in order to implement it.

2192nd plenary meeting
6 December 1973

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3080 (XXVIII)
19 December 1973

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 38

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/9366)/

3080 (XXVIII). Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace",

Reaffirming its conviction that action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Noting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1/ established by General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972 to study the implications of the proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken in furtherance of the objectives of Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Noting with satisfaction the progress made by the Ad Hoc Committee in fulfilling its mandate,

1. Urges all States to accept the principles and objectives contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", as a constructive contribution to the strengthening of regional and international security;

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9029).

2. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to continue its work, to carry out consultations in accordance with its mandate and to report with recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session;

3. Urges all States, especially the major Powers, to extend their co-operation to the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee;

5. Decides that the Ad Hoc Committee shall be provided with summary records of its proceedings;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;

7. Recommends that the statement should be based on available material and prepared with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected b the Secretary-General;

8. Requests that the statement be transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee at a early date, if possible by 31 March 1974;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth sessio an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace".

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6 December 19

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3093 (XXVIII)
16 January 1974

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 102

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/L.701/Rev.1, A/L.715)]

3093 (XXVIII). Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries

A

The General Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction that, as a result of efforts made on a bilateral and regional basis, there has clearly emerged a trend towards the strengthening of peace, the reduction of tension and the settlement of disputed issues by peaceful means,

Considering that all States should take effective steps aimed at eliminating the hotbeds of military conflict which continue to exist in various parts of the world,

Believing that political détente in the world should be supplemented by military détente,

Noting that a reduction in military spending, while helping to limit the arms race and to bring about further improvement in the international situation, would at the same time make it possible to utilize substantial resources for the needs of the peaceful development of all States, including the provision of assistance to developing countries,

1. Recommends that all States permanent members of the Security Council should reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent from the 1973 level during the next financial year;

2. Appeals to the aforementioned States to allot 10 per cent of the funds released as a result of the reduction in military budgets for the provision of assistance to developing countries so as to permit the execution in those countries of the most urgent economic and social projects;

3. Expresses the desire that other States, particularly those with a major economic and military potential, should also take steps to reduce their military budgets and allot part of the funds thus released for the provision of assistance to developing countries;

4. Establishes a Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets, for the provision of assistance to developing countries as an addition to the assistance that is already provided to them through the existing channels, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and also of three countries from each of the regional groups of Africa, Asia and Latin America and two countries from each of the regional groups of Eastern Europe and of Western Europe and other States, which will be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with those regional groups, and instructs the Special Committee to distribute the said funds on an equitable basis, having regard to the most urgent needs and requirements of the recipient countries and without discrimination of any kind, and to determine the amount of the funds to be allotted to the various countries and the schedule for provision of the funds;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to give the Special Committee all possible assistance in its work;

6. Requests the Special Committee to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session.

2194th plenary meeting
7 December 1973

B

The General Assembly,

Having examined the item "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries",

Convinced of the urgent necessity that the States permanent members of the Security Council agree to carry out the reduction of their military budgets, and of the desirability that the other States with a major economic and military potential act accordingly,

Convinced further that a part of the funds released by such a reduction should be set aside for increasing international assistance to developing countries,

Conscious that the United Nations has been unable to study this important question with the required depth and care,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, a report on the reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council, which should also cover other States with a major economic and military potential, and on the utilization of a part of the funds thus saved to provide international assistance to developing countries;

2. Calls upon all Governments to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General to ensure that the study is carried out in the most effective way;

3. Invites the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the General Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-ninth session.

2194th plenary meeting
7 December 1973

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3183 (XXVIII)
6 February 1974

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 32

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/9360)/

3183 (XXVIII). World Disarmament Conference

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and for disarmament,

Convinced that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Deeply convinced that substantial progress in the field of disarmament can be achieved only by ensuring adequate conditions of security for all States,

Convinced also that all States should contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Believing it imperative that all States exert further efforts for the adoption of effective measures of disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament,

Believing also that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could promote the realization of such aims and that the co-operation of all nuclear Powers would considerably facilitate their attainment,

Recalling its resolution 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,

Recalling also its resolution 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, by which it decided to establish a Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,

Bearing in mind the note by the Secretary-General of 17 October 1973 1/ and the statements made during the consideration by the First Committee of the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference",

Noting that, before any conclusion may be reached with regard to preparation for the convening of a world disarmament conference, it will be necessary to carry out considerable study of the relevant existing conditions,

1. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems, including conditions for the realization of such a conference, and to submit, on the basis of consensus, a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session;

2. Decides further that the Ad Hoc Committee shall consist of the following forty non-nuclear-weapon Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultation with all regional groups: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia;

3. Invites the States possessing nuclear weapons to co-operate or maintain contact with the Ad Hoc Committee, it being understood that they will enjoy the same rights as the appointed members of the Committee;

4. Invites all States to communicate as soon as possible to the Secretary-General, for transmission to the Ad Hoc Committee, any views and suggestions they deem pertinent to submit for the purpose defined in paragraph 1 above;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee in its work, including the preparation of summary records;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

2205th plenary meeting
18 December 1973

1/ A/9228.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3184 (XXVIII)
11 February 1974

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 33

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/9361)]

3184 (XXVIII). General and complete disarmament

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, relating to the initiation of bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems,

Recalling further that the first phase of such negotiations resulted in the conclusion, on 26 May 1972, of three bilateral instruments on that matter, 1/

Reaffirming resolution 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, whereby the General Assembly:

(a) Appealed to the above-mentioned Governments to make every effort to expedite the conclusion of further agreements including important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems,

(b) Invited the two Governments to keep the General Assembly informed of the results of their negotiations.

Noting with satisfaction that those Governments have reached a new agreement entitled "Basic principles of negotiations on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms",

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1/ See A/C.1/1026.

Noting further that this agreement, signed on 21 June 1973, has been brought to the attention of the General Assembly by a letter dated 6 November 1973 from the representatives of both Governments to the Secretary-General, 2/

1. Appeals to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to bear constantly in mind in the current phase of the strategic arms limitation talks the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament;

2. Again invites the two Governments to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the results of their negotiations.

2205th plenary meeting
18 December 1973

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, annexed thereto, and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to that Treaty,

Noting that article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty provides, inter alia, that:

> "Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.",

Bearing in mind that the Treaty will have been in force for five years on 5 March 1975 and expecting that the review conference called for in the Treaty will take place soon after that date,

1. Notes that, following appropriate consultation, a preparatory committee has been formed of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the review conference and its preparation.

2205th plenary meeting
18 December 1973

2/ See A/9293.

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, in which it welcomed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on 20 September 1961, 3/

Further recalling its resolutions 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2661 C (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and 2825 B (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament,

Bearing in mind its specific responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations with regard to the principles governing disarmament and to the achievement of general and complete disarmament, which is one of the most important issues confronting the world at present,

Emphasizing the vital interest of all peoples and countries of the world in disarmament negotiations,

Convinced of the importance and urgent need that all States should exert further efforts for the adoption of effective measures of disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

1. Reaffirms the responsibility of the United Nations with regard to all matters pertaining to disarmament, in particular the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. Invites the States parties to disarmament negotiations to ensure that the disarmament measures adopted in one region should not result in increasing armaments in other regions, thus upsetting their stability;

3. Invites the Governments of all States to keep the General Assembly suitably informed of their disarmament negotiations so as to allow the proper performance of its functions;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Member States, as well as all other States and Governments, and to include in the provisional agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly the item entitled "General and complete disarmament".

2205th plenary meeting
18 December 1973

3/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/420
30 April 1974
Original: ENGLISH

JAPAN

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continue to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Recalling also that each State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, in Article IX of the Convention, affirmed the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertook to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapon purposes, and

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Convinced that an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in the wake of the above-mentioned Convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, will contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, and also contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(a) Chemical agents of types and in quantities that have no justification for protective or other peaceful purposes;

(b) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes as soon as possible all agents, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control.

2. States Parties to this Convention shall notify the International Verification Agency, defined in Article VI, of the pending destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of the agents and others as specified under paragraph I of this Article on each such occasion.

3. The States Parties to this Convention shall, in carrying out the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of the agents and others as specified under paragraph 1 of this Article, invite the International Verification Agency to send observers.

4. The International Verification Agency shall forthwith communicate the notification under paragraph 2 of this Article to each State Party to this Convention.

5. The destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of the agents and others as specified under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be reviewed at a conference or conferences of States Parties to this Convention provided for in Article XVII.

6. In implementing the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I.

Article IV

Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles I and II, the States Parties to this Convention may take provisional measures provided for in the Annex I of this Convention until further agreements, including those on effective verification measures, are reached.

Article V

1. Each State Party to this Convention shall take any necessary measures to ensure the fulfilment of its obligations deriving from this Convention, and notify the International Verification Agency of its national organ or organs responsible for taking such necessary measures.

2. Each State Party to this Convention shall submit to the International Verification Agency periodic reports on the state of the fulfilment of its obligations deriving from this Convention in accordance with the provisions of the Annex II.

3. The functions of the national organ referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall include the following:

(a) observation as well as supervision of the national activities related to the subject matter of this Convention;

(b) collection of statistical and other information thereon;

(c) preparation of periodic reports to the International Verification Agency;

(d) co-operation with the International Verification Agency such as presentation thereto of requested statistical and other documents or information, and acceptance of inspection.

Article VI

1. In order to promote the realization of the provisions of this Convention and the fulfilment of obligations assumed by the States Parties under this Convention, the States Parties to this Convention shall establish an International Verification Agency.

2. The functions of the International Verification Agency shall include the following:

(a) to analyse and evaluate periodic reports and statistical and other documents or information submitted by each State Party;

(b) to request explanation and conduct inquiries as under Article VIII;

(c) to conduct inspection as under Article IX;

(d) to send notifications and reports as under Article X;

(e) to consult and co-operate with the national organs;

(f) to make recommendations for amendments to the Annexes;

(g) to send observers as under Article II;

(h) to carry out decisions which may be made at the conference of States Parties to this Convention.

3. Details pertaining to the composition and functions of the International Verification Agency shall be provided for in Annex III.

Article VII

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another directly or through the International Verification Agency and co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, this Convention.

Article VIII

1. Any State Party to this Convention which suspects that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of this Convention may request, directly or through the International Verification Agency that State Party to provide explanations. This request should include a list of all the evidence that roused the suspicion.

2. Request for explanations as under paragraph 1 may also be made by the International Verification Agency, when it deems it to be necessary.

3. The State Party which is requested to provide explanations under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall comply with such request in good faith. This State Party may request the International Verification Agency to conduct an inquiry. This request should include evidence which it considers sufficient to remove suspicion.

Article IX

1. A State Party which has been requested to provide explanations as under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII may at any time invite the International Verification Agency to conduct an inspection in its territory.

2. If the State Party which is requested to provide explanation as under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII fails to provide adequate explanations, the International Verification Agency may notify such State Party of an impending inspection to be conducted in its territory.

3. The State Party which is notified by the International Verification Agency of inspection as under paragraph 2 of this Article shall make every effort to accept, as

soon as possible, such inspection in its territory. The State Party which finds it impossible to accept such inspection in its territory shall provide adequate reasons to the International Verification Agency why the State Party finds it impossible to accept the inspection.

Article X

1. The International Verification Agency shall notify each State Party to this Convention of the results of analysis and evaluation as under paragraph 2(a) of Article VI, of explanation or inquiry as under Article VIII, and of inspection as under Article IX.

2. The International Verification Agency may, when it is deemed necessary, report the contents of the notification as under paragraph 1 of this Article to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Article XI

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any Party to this Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides, upon notification as provided for in Article X, that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of this Convention.

Article XII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as well as under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Article XIII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving an agreement, as soon as possible, which will make it possible to eliminate the provisional measures referred to in Article IV.

Article XIV

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of chemical agents for peaceful purposes. Parties to this Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, including the international exchange of chemical agents and equipment for the processing, use or production of chemical agents for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article XV

The Annexes referred to in this Convention shall constitute an integral part of this Convention.

Article XVI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to this Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XVII

1. Three years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of States Parties to this Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, with a view to assuring that the purpose of the preamble and the provisions of this Convention are being realized. At intervals of three years thereafter, further conferences shall be held with the same objective of reviewing the operation of this Convention, if a majority of the Parties to this Convention submit a proposal to this effect to the International Verification Agency. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.

2. The International Verification Agency shall convoke a conference of States Parties to this Convention as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article XVIII

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party to this Convention shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to this Convention, the International Verification Agency and to the Security Council of the United Nations three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XIX

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ( ), which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by ( ) Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of this Convention.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XX

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

Done in _____ copies at _____,
this _____ day of _____, _____.

Annex I (Alternative A)

1. States Parties to the Convention may suspend the application of Articles I and II of the Convention with regard to the chemical agents which come under the categories in the schedule to this Annex.

2. States Parties to the Convention desiring to invoke the provisions of paragraph 1 above shall so notify the Depositary Governments at the time of, or within ( ) days from, the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
The Depositary Governments shall forthwith communicate these notifications to all signatory and acceding States and the International Verification Agency.

3. Any State Party to the Convention may propose amendments to the schedule to this Annex. The text of any such amendment and the reasons therefor shall be communicated to the International Verification Agency which shall communicate them to the States Parties.

4. If a proposed amendment circulated under paragraph 3 above has not been rejected by any State Party within ( ) months after it has been circulated, it shall thereupon enter into force. If however a proposed amendment is rejected by any State Party, the International Verification Agency may decide, in the light of comments received from States Parties, whether a conference shall be called to consider such amendments.

Annex I (Alternative B)

1. States Parties to the Convention may exclude from prohibition the chemical agents to which they consider it impossible to apply forthwith Articles I and II of the Convention. However, the agents listed in the schedule to this Annex shall never in any circumstances be excluded from the prohibition.

2, 3 and 4. (same as paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Alternative (A))

Schedule to Annex I

Annex II

Annex III

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/421
14 May 1974
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Presentation of defence expenditures and their distribution for defence purposes

I. Introduction

Collection and presentation of data on defence expenditures would provide a better basis for the assessment by governments of short- and long-term trends in defence efforts and their consequences for the military balance. Such openness, which does not exist today in many States, would increase mutual confidence among States and reduce the risk for arms race by suspicion or misunderstanding.

This paper includes an analysis of what economic data would be of interest for that purpose and, therefore, should be made generally available. As an example, such data concerning the defenoe expenditures of Sweden are included in the appendix.

II. Basic requirement - the definition of defence expenditure

Information concerning defence expenditure is contained in the official public accounts of central governments. States differ, however, in their definitions of defence expenditure, and information concerning their methods of classification is commonly not available. Some expenditures which would be considered as military may be excluded from the official data. In addition, there are often differences within States in the basis of pricing of military output as compared with that of the output of the rest of the economy. Furthermore, different States have different economic structures and patterns of prices.

For these reasons official statistics on defence expenditure when used to increase mutual confidence among States would greatly benefit from a common definition of the concept and an agreement to supply information concerning the methods of classification used in each State.

It may not be easy to define the concept in exact terms but the official statistics on defence expenditure normally include:

- pay and allowances to military personnel
- pay to civilian personnel
- Operations and maintenance
- procurement
- research and development
- construction

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Furthermore in many States the following expenditures are also considered as defence expenditure;

- military aid
- civil defence
- pensions to retired personnel
- para-military forces
- parts of or total expenditure for certain activities that are acknowledged as having mixed civil/military functions, e.g., space research, atomic energy.

III. Matters to be covered by the presentation of statistics on defence expenditure

1. The level and trend of defence expenditure over the past decade according to official defence budget and including defence expenditure incurred outside the budget.

Here it is essential to supply information as to what expenditures are considered as defence expenditure in various States.

2. The same as III.1 but in relation to the level and trend of GNP for the State.

3. The distribution and break-down of military expenditure in terms of procurement, personnel, research and development, capital investment and other.

In order to use trends of defence expenditure as information about a State's military potential, it is necessary to analyse the distribution of the expenditures in the terms listed above. This distribution can be used in an analysis of which basic decisions concerning military resource allocation and which decisions on principles of defence production and organization are made in different States. The distribution can also be of value when considering how much of a State's defence resources is consumed in the short run, and how much represents investments giving returns in terms of military potential in the long run. For the latter purpose the expenditures can be distributed into:

- Expenditures used to maintain present defence resources in the short run.
- Expenditures used to renew old equipment and add new equipment.
- Expenditures used for research and development giving returns in the long run.

4. The level and trend of employment of manpower within the defence organization and in defence related activities (e.g. defence related industry).

Statistics on manpower employed by the defence authorities, and statistics on the number of employees in other sectors of a State's economy but still engaged in production for the defence, give valuable information about both military potential and the economic consequences of the arms race for a State. Statistics on the proportion used for defence production for export is also of value. Statistics on the proportion of a State's total labour force which is used for defence purposes is often considered as an indicator of the influence of defence activities on the rate of growth of a State's economy.

5. The level and trend of manpower and financial resources devoted to research and development for defence purposes as a proportion of the State's total expenditure for research and development.

A State's military potential in the long run is to a large extent based on the priority given to research and development for defence purposes. Statistics on this matter should cover the use of human and financial resources for defence research at both government authorities and government financed defence research in industry.

6. Cost growth within the defence sector.

In many States the production for defence purposes shows a cost disadvantage compared to the economy as a whole. There are also indicators of differences in cost growth between States. The relative military potential is strongly influenced by the relative trend in prices of goods and services used for military purposes and the relative cost trend of production within the defence authorities.

7. The level, trend and structure of defence-related imports and exports and provided or received military aid.

The geographical spread of the arms race is of essential interest in measuring military potential. The possibility of valuing the flow of weapons, military equipment and other defence-related goods and to analyse its geographic pattern is of main importance to further developments in arms control and disarmament. Analysis of trends in the arms trade, in military aid and of supply and import policies demand statistics which could be supplied by the States.

Estimating the amount of arms supply in cases of no or partial payment only is of course a difficult problem even if the supply is materially specified. This is also true in cases of joint or licensed production programmes. Accuracy ambitions, therefore, have to be limited.

Information about defence-related imports and exports and military aid is also necessary in order to pay attention to differences in the pattern of defence production between the industrialized and the less industrialized countries and between allies of military blocs. Imports and exports of the technologically advanced weapons and military equipment characterized by high degrees of technical know-how have expanded quickly and the build-up of stocks of weapons in less industrialized countries is one of the new features. Statistics on arms trade and military aid also give valuable information about the military posture of a State. The arms trade influences economic development in the recipient regions through the diversion of resources for purchase and maintenance of weapons and military equipment. The economic structure of a recipient country also tends to be affected by the usually close relations established between suppliers and recipients.

Statistics on arms trade and military aid to be supplied should measure the full monetary value of the flow of military goods. The monetary value may not correspond to actual prices paid, which vary considerably according to different pricing methods, the degree of aid and the terms involved in each individual transaction. In this matter it is also necessary to deal with the measuring problems connected with joint and licensed production of weapons.

IV. Regularity of information

It would seem desirable if information on the matters discussed in this paper could be provided by States on an annual basis.

APPENDIX

Example of a presentation of defence expenditures, their distribution for different purposes and other matters discussed in the working document

The following should be seen as an example of information that could be supplied on the matters discussed in the working document. The figures are taken from official Swedish statistics.

II. The definition of Swedish defence expenditures

The "total defence" of Sweden consists of four component parts: the "military defence", the "civil defence", the "economic defence" and the "psychological defence".

The Swedish concept of "total defence" thus has a very broad significance. It includes not only military defence but also measures to protect the population from war damages, to ensure supplies of goods and services, and to maintain the will to defend and a spirit of resistance. Even such functions as medical care, social welfare, police system, and communications as well as other social activities must be adapted during war according to the pattern of the total defence effort.

Preparations for defence must make it possible not only to meet a military invasion and other forms of military attack but also to meet such events as isolation and political and economic threats.

The components of military expenditures are: payment and allowances to military personnel, civilian personnel and conscripts, expenditures for operations and maintenance, expenditures for procurement of munition, research and development expenditures and expenditures for construction of buildings and fortifications.

Sweden has no military expenditure abroad except for advances for United Nations troops, neither does Sweden receive military aid from abroad.

Real resources used for military ends are, except for expenditures for construction of buildings and fortifications, classified in the national accounts as consumption. The reason for this is that the use of resources for these ends is not presumed to add to the productive capital stock. This rule of classification of expenditures should be noticed when reading table III.3.

III.1 The level and trend of Swedish defence expenditures over the past decade

a. The "total defence" expenditures 1963/64 - 1973/74
Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns 1/

1963/64	4 325
1964/65	4 737
1965/66	5 309
1966/67	5 493
1967/68	5 595
1968/69	5 804
1969/70	6 121
1970/71	6 458
1971/72	6 950
1972/73	7 404
1973/74	7 919

b. The "military defence" expenditures 1963/64 - 1973/74
Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns 1/ 2/

1963/64	3 848
1964/65	4 109
1965/66	4 759
1966/67	4 733
1967/68	4 862
1968/69	4 987
1969/70	5 330
1970/71	5 810
1971/72	6 249
1972/73	6 952
1973/74	7 382

1/ Actual results for the fiscal years 1963/64 to 1971/72 calculated results for the fiscal years 1972/73 and 1973/74.

2/ Some social costs, earlier excluded, are included for the fiscal years 1972/73 and 1973/74.

c. The "military defence" expenditures 1963/64 - 1973/74
Constant price figures according to the Swedish "net price index", 1971/72 prices. Millions of Swedish crowns 1/ 2/ 3/

1963/64	5 251
1964/65	5 354
1965/66	5 954
1966/67	5 653
1967/68	5 699
1968/69	5 768
1969/70	5 864
1970/71	6 080
1971/72	6 249
1972/73	6 685
1973/74	6 823

d. The "civil defence" expenditures 1963/64 - 1973/74
Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns 1/

1963/64	57.5
1964/65	75.5
1965/66	69.2
1966/67	102.0
1967/68	87.4
1968/69	104.2
1969/70	113.6
1970/71	110.1
1971/72	153.7
1972/73	126.8
1973/74	136.8

1/ Actual results for the fiscal years 1963/64 to 1971/72, calculated results for the fiscal years 1972/73 and 1973/74.

2/ Some social costs, earlier excluded, are included for the fiscal years 1972/73 and 1973/74.

3/ The price corrections, to remove the price increases caused by inflation, for the fiscal years 1972/73 and 1973/74 are based on an assumption of 4 per cent price increases per year.

III.2 The Swedish defence expenditures related to GNP and total public expenditures

a. The "military defence" expenditures as a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) to factor costs 1961/62 - 1971/72

1961/62	4.38
1962/63	4.53
1963/64	4.44
1964/65	4.29
1965/66	4.56
1966/67	4.20
1967/68	4.04
1968/69	3.86
1969/70	3.73
1970/71	3.75
1971/72	3.78

b. The "total defence" expenditures as a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) to factor costs 1963/64 - 1971/72

1963/64	4.99
1964/65	4.95
1965/66	5.09
1966/67	4.87
1967/68	4.65
1968/69	4.49
1969/70	4.28
1970/71	4.16
1971/72	4.20

c. The "military defence" expenditures as a percentage of total public expenditures (federal budget) 1/

1961/62	17.53
1962/63	17.38
1963/64	17.45
1964/65	15.97
1965/66	16.08
1966/67	14.18
1967/68	13.38
1968/69	12.83
1969/70	12.05
1970/71	12.04
1971/72	11.26
1972/73	11.23
1973/74	11.00

1/ See footnote 2, table III.1.c.

d. The "total defence" expenditures as a percentage of total public expenditures (federal budget).

1963/64	19.62
1964/65	18.41
1965/66	17.94
1966/67	16.46
1967/68	15.39
1968/69	14.93
1969/70	13.84
1970/71	13.38
1971/72	12.52
1972/73	11.96
1973/74	11.80

III.3. The distribution of Swedish military expenditures in terms of procurement, personnel, research and development, capital investment and other purposes 1962/63-1973/74. Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns and percentage*

	Procurement		Personnel		Research and development		Capital investment		Other expenditure		Total military expenditure
3/ 1976/77											
3/ 1975/76											
3/ 1974/75											
2/ 1973/74	1 990	27.0%	2 425	32.9%	646	8.8%	403	5.5%	1 918	26.0%	7 382
2/ 1972/73	1 892	27.2%	2 248	32.3%	653	9.4%	402	5.8%	1 757	25.3%	6 952
1/ 1971/72	1 968	30.0%	1 801	27.5%	449	6.9%	311	4.7%	2 024	31.0%	6 553
1/ 1970/71	1 746	29.4%	1 602	26.9%	351	5.9%	287	4.8%	1 959	32.4%	5 945
1/ 1969/70	1 620	28.0%	1 550	26.7%	370	6.3%	320	5.5%	1 740	30.0%	5 797
1/ 1968/69	1 390	26.0%	1 460	27.2%	460	8.6%	305	5.7%	1 740	32.5%	5 348
1/ 1967/68	1 450	27.9%	1 280	24.6%	425	8.2%	305	5.9%	1 740	33.5%	5 194
1/ 1966/67	1 520	29.7%	1 260	24.0%	410	8 %	310	6 %	1 640	32 %	5 117
1/ 1965/66	1 430	28.6%	1 300	26.0%	400	8 %	300	6 %	1 550	31 %	5 011
1/ 1964/65	1 240	28.5%	1 120	25.6%	350	8 %	260	6 %	1 400	32 %	4 360
1/ 1963/64	1 280	31.8%	970	23.9%	320	8 %	240	6 %	1 210	30 %	4 042
1/ 1962/63	1 130	30.4%	810	21.7%	300	8 %	220	6 %	1 270	34 %	3 735

1/ For the fiscal years 1962-63 to 1971-72 total costs are actual results in current prices.

2/ For the fiscal years 1972-73 and 1973-74 total costs are calculated results in current prices. The comparatively large changes in values from fiscal year 1971-72 are to a certain extent attributable to a change in statistical methods.

3/ For the fiscal years 1974-75 to 1976-77 the basis for planning is a horizontal cost development in real terms.

* The total figures in this table are not fully consistent with the figures in table III.1.b. due to a different statistical method.

III.4 The level and trend of employment of manpower within the Swedish defence organization and in defence - related activities

The Swedish National Defence is based on general military conscription and so the country has no professional armed forces. This means that in addition to permanently employed personnel, the National Defence utilizes a large number of conscripted personnel for training. Slightly less than one third of defence expenditure covers the costs for permanently employed personnel. The remaining two thirds is used to purchase goods and services from other sectors of the economy. Labour is thus tied up in production for defence purposes.

a. Manpower directly and indirectly employed in production for defence in Sweden for the years 1958, 1964 and 1968

	Number employed in different years			
	1958	1964	1968	1972
By the defence authorities, employees (a)	51,000	51,000	51.000	50,000
Conscripts in military training, man-years (b)	52,000	52,000	52,000	50,000
Employees in other sectors engaged in production for defence (c)	55,000	50,000	48,000	40,000
Total engaged in defence (a+b+c) (d)	158,000	153,000	151,000	140,000
Total labour force (e)	3,510,000	3,680,000	3,700,000	3,860,000
(d) as a percentage of (e)	4.5	4.2	4.1	3.6

It is apparent that the number of conscripts expressed as the number of man-years utilized, has remained rather unchanged during the years shown. This is because the extent of the training is primarily determined by the size of the appropriate age group year after year. Thus utilization of available labour for this purpose is not influenced by the usual economic laws and principles but is more or less exogenously given.

The total volume of goods and services bought by the National Defence from other sectors of the economy increased only insignificantly between 1964 and 1972. It is therefore natural that the numbers employed in production for defence decreased owing to increases in productivity within the delivering sectors.

The number of permanent employees in the National Defence has been rather constant during the entire period. The savings in personnel which rationalization and normal increases in productivity within the National Defence have resulted in, have thus been employed for other purposes within the defence authorities. A certain proportion of the gains in productivity have, however, likely been used to compensate for decreases in the length of the work week.

The last line in the table gives the proportion of the total labour force within Sweden utilized for defence purposes. It should be remembered, though, that defence expenditure includes a large proportion of imported goods and services. Calculations show that about three fourths of the goods and services purchased by the National Defence utilize domestic productive capacity while one fourth utilizes the productive capacities of other countries. These imported goods and services must be paid for, however. It can thus be assumed that about 16,000 persons are employed in production of the goods which must be exported to balance the imports caused by defence expenditure. The proportion of the economy's labour resources utilized for defence production in 1964 in this wider meaning would then increase to about 4.6 per cent. To obtain an approximation for the society's costs for the military defence, the percentages in the last line of the table should thus be increased by 0.4 percentage points.

It should be noticed that both the numbers employed by the defence authorities and the numbers employed in other sectors engaged in production for defence have somewhat decreased since 1968.

b. Manpower directly employed by the defence authorities is apparent from the following table with figures for September 1972 (within parentheses) and for March 1973;

	Military personnel	Civilian-military personnel 1/	Civilian personnel	Total
Armed Forces	(8,537) 8,485	(1,010) 999	(9,796) 9,642	(19,343) 19,126
Naval Forces	(3,599) 3,608	(192) 173	(4,367) 4,312	(8,158) 8,093
Air Forces	(2,261) 2,238	(2,725) 2,706	(5,124) 5,061	(10,110) 10,005
Central and regional staffs	(1,176) 1,190	(202) 206	(2,338) 2,288	(3,716) 3,684
Central agencies and functions	(668) 686	(162) 154	(8,370) 8,299	(9,200) 9,139
Total military defence	(16,241) 16,207	(4,291) 4,238	(29,995) 29,602	(50,527) 50,047
Percentage distribution	(32.1%)	(8.5%)	(59.4%)	(100%)
	32.4%	8.5%	59.1%	100%

1/ Specially educated military personnel, e.g. technicians.

III.5 The level and trend of manpower and financial resources devoted to research and development for defence purposes

It can be estimated that technical and scientific research and development activities in Sweden in 1964 corresponded to about 1.5 per cent of the GNP. Partial studies indicate that this proportion has since increased and that it was 1.7 per cent in 1967.

The level and development of the total human and financial resources devoted to research and the portions devoted to primarily military purposes are apparent from the following tables. The total costs for purchase by the National Defence of specific research and development projects is given in the research statistics (line c). This is, however, not true to the same extent for the other sectors of the economy. Thus it would seem that the statistics overestimate the National Defence's proportion of the total research and development costs.

The data have been collected using surveys from the recipients of research commissions. Such recipients, who have deeper insights into the problem area than the client, do not consider the whole project as research and development. This is an important explanation for the difference between the figures given here and those to be found in table III.3.

a. Financial recourses for research and development. Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns */

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Total research and development (a)	981	1,013	1,148	1,293	1,513
Defence research at government authorities and institutions (b)	100	100	103	104	103
Government-financed defence research in industry (c)	220	172	180	200	240
Defence research as a percentage of all research, (b) + (c) as a percentage of (a)	32%	27%	25%	24%	23%

b. Human resources for research and development. Number of man-years.

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Total research and development (a)	19,800	21,169	22,068	22,974	23,200
Defence research at government authorities and institutions (b)	2,000	2,079	2,112	2,122	2,100
Government-financed defence research in industry (c)	4,570	3,840	3,515	3,980	3,500
Defence research as a percentage of all research, (b) + (c) as a percentage of (a)	35%	28%	25%	26%	25%

*/ Statistics from more recent years on the matter shown in tables a. and b. are not at present available but can, if necessary, be worked out for future discussions.

As can be seen from the tables, more and more human and financial resources are being devoted to research and development activities. The increase is restricted to research having civilian character. The procurement of munitions has remained at an approximately unchanged volume, over time, and as a result of this it is reasonable that also the absolute volume of the resources devoted to research and development of military character should have remained constant or decreased slightly.

Thus, military research and development in Sweden utilizes a large proportion of the limited supply of qualified researchers and scientists. However, it should be pointed out that the National Defence does not utilize a certain portion of a given number of researchers. The National Defence's demand for researchers has been one of the reasons why education of researchers and scientists has been carried out to the extent which has been the case and that the supply of researchers is as big as it is. The number of research workers used for military research and development has been fairly constant during recent years and so defence research has decreased in proportion to the total research efforts.

III.6 Cost growth within the defence sector.

Like in many other countries the tendency towards rapid increases in personnel costs is observable in Sweden. At the same time investments in new technology have run up ever higher bills. A consequence of increased personnel costs has been for consumption to in some extent increase its share at the expense of investments. However we still spend about one-third of our defence budget on new weapons, research and development and more than 5 per cent on new buildings and fortifications. That puts our investments close to 40 per cent of our defence budget - an internationally high figure.

III. 7 The level, trend and structure of defence-related imports and exports and provided or received military aid. */ **/

a. Estimated values of Swedish imports of military equipment 1/ 1969-1974. Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns. 2/

1969	230.6
1970	204.1
1971	98.8
1972	173.9
1973	250.2
1974	210.6

1/ Including non-military products consumed/paid by the Swedish defence.

2/ Estimates are made in October each year, except for 1974, where the figure is estimated in March.

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*/ It should be noted that the year-to-year movements in the figures presented in this section often are rather erratic, due to the fact that the figures are affected by dominant import/export-projects.

**/ The figures presented include direct import and export only and no licensing fees. Precise estimates of the latter may be produced.

). Estimated values of Swedish imports of military equipment 1969-1974, distributed on suppliers. Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns.

Suppliers	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Austria	1.2	5.3	2.3	3.4	13.8	7.5
Belgium	-	-	1.2	3.6	6.8	4.0
Canada	-	4.4	5.7	2.6	1.7	2.7
Czechoslovakia	3.0	0.1	-	-	-	
Denmark	1.1	1.7	3.3	3.2	2.3	1.2
Egypt	-	1.7	-	-	-	
Finland	46.1	2.6	1.3	0.5	1.3	1.3
France	27.8	14.4	8.1	8.6	2.2	15.9
FR Germany	10.4	9.8	11.5	32.3	30.8	10.3
Hongkong	-	2.1	0.4	-	0.3	0.5
Italy	18.6	14.6	4.7	6.3	0.4	1.9
Japan	-	-	-	-	25.2	13.1
Kuwait	-	-	-	-	-	5.0
Netherlands	30.2	1.3	2.8	2.2	2.1	11.7
Norway	7.8	3.9	5.2	11.2	18.6	10.1
Poland	-	-	-	0.5	-	
Portugal	-	3.4	-	-	-	
Romania	-	-	-	-	4.1	6.0
Switzerland	1.7	2.9	0.7	1.0	2.0	4.2
United Kingdom	51.1	33.3	32.5	44.9	50.1	40.5
USA	31.6	101.5	19.1	45.2	75.2	64.7
USSR	-	-	-	6.4	12.4	10.0
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	0.9	
Yugoslavia	-	1.1	-	1.8	-	

b. Estimated values of Swedish imports of military equipment 1974, classified by kind of equipment. Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns.

Electrical and telephone-equipment	83.1
Oil	31.5
Engine-equipment	24.5
Aircraft- and helicopter-equipment	19.5
Missile-equipment	18.5
Vehicle-equipment	13.1
Weapon and ammunition	11.8
Warship-equipment	2.0
Shelter-equipment	1.7
Textile	1.3
Metal	0.7
Bridge-equipment	0.6
Optical equipment	0.5
Other	1.8
Total	210.6

d. Total values of Swedish exports of military equipment 1964-1973. Current prices. Millions of Swedish crowns.

1964	129.1
1965	190.2
1966	141.6
1967	138.8
1968	156.0
1969	159.7
1970	321.8
1971	626.6
1972	359.0
1973	333.7

e. Sweden does not provide any military aid and has no military expenditures abroad except for advances for United Nations troops and neither does Sweden receive any military aid from abroad.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/422
23 May 1974
Original: ENGLISH

PAKISTAN

Some excerpts from the statement made on 19 May 1974 by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the nuclear underground text explosion conducted by India on 18 May 1974

India has been at loggerheads, in one way or another, with practically all its neighbours. Most serious differences have been with Pakistan and China. As far as we are concerned, we set in train the process of normalizing relations with India at Simla two years ago and there has been a step by step progress in that direction. As far as China is concerned, it has officially declared that with the implementation of the Security Council resolution 307 (1971), it is looking forward to the establishment of normal relations with all States of the sub-continent. Unless India seeks to reverse this evolution we cannot see relevance of this nuclear exercise to the immediate political setting of the sub-continent.

Moreover, we must realize that the exercise of nuclear threat by a nuclear weapon power against a non-nuclear weapon country is something which affects not only the victim but also the entire international community, particularly the Great Powers. Let us not, therefore, feel that we cannot secure political counter measures against a potential nuclear threat from India. We shall not let ourselves be alone in facing this challenge. India has dynamited and shattered to pieces the non-Proliferation Treaty. This is bound to embolden Israel and South Africa to further work of demolition. It is not only we, therefore, but the Asian-African community that has been exposed to a new menace.

There is, therefore, no reason why Pakistan should abandon its efforts to explore the possibility of a political action against nuclear threat. In as much as proliferation of nuclear weapons is a danger to the whole world, the United Nations has a clear and pressing duty to address itself more vigorously to the question of credible security assurances against nuclear threat or blackmail to all non-nuclear weapons States. The existing assurances extended by the Security Council lack credibility. Nor can the United States - Soviet statement to act jointly to prevent nuclear war inspire sufficient confidence among victims of would-be nuclear aggressors. What is needed is a joint undertaking in the nature of an obligation by all the permanent members of the Security Council to act collectively or individually on behalf of the threatened State. In other words, a nuclear umbrella of all five Great Powers or, failing that, of at least one of them is the irreducible minimum of protection that is required to give States like Pakistan a real assurance of security against nuclear threat or blackmail.

It has to be understood by all concerned powers that Pakistan's anxiety in this respect cannot but be unparalleled. No two among the five great nuclear-weapon powers --United States, Soviet Union, China, France and Britain -- have had a history of confrontation and wars between them in contemporary times or in past remotely comparable to the relations between India and Pakistan. In barely a quarter century between 1947 and 1971, India has gone to war three times against Pakistan. Throughout this period India has spurned all possible methods of peaceful settlement of its disputes with Pakistan. The last war was the result of India's armed intervention in order to bring about disintegration of Pakistan. Against this background which is unique in the present age, we repeatedly warned the great powers and also Canada that India would betray its assurances and its bilateral agreement with Canada and explode a nuclear device in order to claim status of a nuclear-weapon power. These warnings went unheeded. Meanwhile over two decades India steadily acquired nuclear know-how, built plutonium device of the type it exploded in RAJASTHAN on Saturday, 18 May 1974. This production took place in Canada-India reactor which was supplied on the express understanding that it would be used for constructive purposes only. I am not surprised and hardly relieved that the Canadian Government has expressed itself as very disturbed by the announcement of the Indian explosion and has termed it as a severe setback to international efforts to prevent nuclear testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Such statements, while welcome in intent, cannot assuage our fears. Given the brutal fact of 18 May explosion, Pakistan cannot be expected to rest on technicalities and protocol. It would be unfair, indeed immoral, that India's flagrant violation of non-proliferation assurances should make nuclear-weapon powers resort to the double perversity of not only condoning it but also giving it a blessing by putting a stop or imposing restrictions on normal nuclear programmes of other States.

Indeed at this stage we are taking steps to secure a political insurance against India's use of nuclear threat and I can announce some of these steps; we are formally approaching the Secretary-General of the United Nations and I am also sending the Foreign Secretary to China, France and Britain to explain our position to their Governments. I am visiting the Soviet Union myself and will take up this question with the Soviet leaders. I have asked the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence to raise this issue at the CENTO meeting, Washington DC, and to hold urgent discussions with officials of the United States Government. He will thereafter go to Canada, which has made singular contribution to India's nuclear capability. I am also addressing letters to Heads of States and Governments of all nuclear weapons States.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/423
23 May 1974
Original: ENGLISH

PAKISTAN

Statement issued on 19 May 1974 at Islamabad by an official spokesman of the Government of Pakistan on India's explosion of an underground nuclear device on 18 May 1974

"This does not come as a surprise to us. We have been repeatedly warning the United Nations particularly the nuclear weapon powers and the International Community for a decade that India's ambitious nuclear programme aimed at equipping itself with a nuclear option was being undertaken to carry out a nuclear weapon explosion and stake a claim to the status of a nuclear weapon power.

It must be stated that the news of the underground nuclear explosion by India is a development which cannot but be viewed with the degree of concern matching its magnitude by the whole world and more especially, by India's immediate neighbours. This concern can in no way be alleviated by India's contentions that the test has been carried out for peaceful purposes. It is an incontrovertible fact, stressed by the super powers themselves that there is no difference between explosion of a so-called peaceful nuclear device and the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Therefore, any state which explodes a so-called peaceful nuclear device stands as much in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the one which tests it for military purposes. Hence, India's disavowal of intention to produce nuclear weapons is lacking in credibility.

The principal aim of Non-Proliferation Treaty which was concluded in 1968 under sponsorship and aegis of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons among States other than the then five nuclear weapon powers, namely, themselves and France, Britain and the People's Republic of China. Now that India has taken the fateful step, throwing restraint to the winds and in contradiction to its earlier disavowal of designs to carry out a nuclear explosion, efforts of the United Nations and the International Community since Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty of 196 to curb nuclear arms race have been rendered futile. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been dealt a death blow."

GE.74-65138
74-18656

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/424
23 May 1974
Original: ENGLISH

INDIA

Text of the official announcement made by the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, regarding the underground peaceful nuclear explosion experiment conducted on 18 May 1974

The Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India, announced today that it carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment using an implosion device. The explosion was carried out at a depth of more than 100 metres.

As part of the programme of study of peaceful uses of nuclear explosion, the Government of India had undertaken a programme to keep itself abreast of developments in this technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of mining and earth-moving operations.

The Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India, also stated that India had no intention of producing nuclear weapons, and reiterated its strong opposition to military uses of nuclear explosions.

GE.74-65193
74-18691

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/425
23 May 1974
Original: ENGLISH

INDIA

Statement made by the Minister of External Affairs of India on 21 May 1974 on the peaceful underground nuclear explosion conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission of India on 18 May 1974

We are very happy to note that the peaceful nuclear experiment which took place on 18 May 1974 represents a step forward on the road to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the welfare of our people. I would like to congratulate our scientists and others who have made possible this achievement by our country. This experiment is an important landmark in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful and economic uses. We have no intention of developing nuclear weapons.

Indian scientists and technologists have been active in this field for two decades; and it is well-known that already two atomic power plants are supplying nuclear energy into our national power grid for the use of our people. The present experiment is important because it represents our resolve to develop our indigenous resources of energy for the benefit of our people through our own efforts. In performing this scientific test, India has not violated any of her international obligations. We are heartened by the enthusiastic support which we have received in this endeavour from countries of the developing world.

It is singularly unfortunate that the peaceful nature of this nuclear experiment of ours should be misconstrued and misread in Pakistan. Apprehensions aroused in Pakistan are unfounded. We value our commitment under the Simla Agreement to settle all our differences with Pakistan by peaceful and bilateral means. Moreover, both countries have resolved that past policies of confrontation and conflict are banished for ever.

We hope therefore that whatever misconception has arisen in Pakistan about this experiment will be replaced after cool reflection by more objective and realistic assessment. India has always supported development of co-operation amongst countries of this region on the basis of sovereign equality. Pakistan's allegations of hegemonistic designs have no basis at all and are, to say the least, uncharitable.

GE.74-65178
74-18694

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/426
23 May 1974
Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Text of a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, The Honourable Mitchell Sharp
22 May 1974

As I mentioned in my statement on May 18 the Government was very disturbed by the announcement that India had exploded a nuclear device and today cabinet has been giving serious study to the implications of this unfortunate development.

Our concern is related to two important aspects. First, we are concerned as to the effect that India's action, whatever its motivation, will have on international efforts, to which Canada has been an active Party, to limit and control the proliferation of nuclear explosion technology for which there can be no distinction between peaceful and potential military application. For all intents and purposes, therefore, India now has developed the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. Many years ago Canada could have developed a similar capability but we chose not to do so because of our view that the dubious advantages of having our own explosive device were far outweighed by the dangers to world peace and security. The development of this technology by India is bound to have serious and wide-spread repercussions throughout Asia and the world.

Secondly, we are very distressed and concerned that this latest member of the nuclear club should be a country with which successive Canadian Governments have carried on over the past two decades extensive co-operation in the nuclear energy field. This long-standing co-operation with India in the nuclear energy field has involved the gift, under the Colombo Plan, of a nuclear research reactor; the provison of credit, expertise, materials and fuel for two electric generating reactors, and a variety of technical exchanges and training of personnel, etc. All of this assistance was intended to help India in meeting the critical energy needs of the Indian people and was provided to, and accepted by, India on the basis that it would be used for peaceful purposes only. We have made it clear in international discussions and in bilateral exchanges with India that the creation of a nuclear explosion for so-called peaceful purposes could not be considered as a peaceful purpose within the meaning of our co-operative arrangements.

GE.74-65182
74-18697

Canada continues to attach great importance to its general relations with India and remains anxious to contribute to the economic and social progress of the Indian people. It fully respects India's sovereignty and independence in all matters. It cannot, however, be expected to assist and subsidize, directly or indirectly, a nuclear programme which, in a key respect, undermines the position which Canada has for a long time been firmly convinced is best for world peace and security.

In view of the serious implications internationally and for our bilateral relations resulting from India's explosion of a nuclear device, Canada intends to reassess its nuclear co-operation with India as the Prime Minister had warned the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, would be done if India developed such a device. We are seeking information from India on the source of the plutonium used in the explosion and on the specific ways in which they expect this nuclear explosion technique will benefit Indian economic development commensurate with the costs involved. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited has recalled for discussions Mr. Morrow, its resident representative in Bombay. The Canadian Government has suspended shipments to India of nuclear equipment and material and has instructed AECL, pending clarification of the situation, to suspend its co-operation with India regarding nuclear reactor projects and the more general technological exchange arrangements which it has with the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.

Canada will propose early discussions with India on future relations between our two countries, including, in particular, a discussion on the implications of this latest development for India's economic priorities. Canada is conscious of the very large costs involved in the normal development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and we have an appreciation of the substantial additional resources, material, managerial and technical, which must be devoted to the development of explosive devices. Canada does not intend to share the burden of relieving such costs. As a result, the Canadian Government is not prepared at this time to agree to any roll-over of India's commercial debt to Canada, which is largely related to India's nuclear energy programme. The Canadian Government, however, does not plan to interrupt its continuing programme of food and agricultural aid to the sub-continent although it will be reviewing other elements in the aid programme in consultation with the Indian authorities.

I am informing the Indian High Commissioner (Ottawa) of the steps outlined above.

With regard to the broader international implications of India's nuclear explosion, Cabinet has directed that officials enter into immediate consultations with a number of other governments, including those which have been involved in India's nuclear development programme, signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other members of the International Atomic Energy Agency.